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Abstract 
 
 Why did Brazilians living in Massachusetts show their electoral support for Jair Bolsonaro 
with 86% of the vote while those in the home polity did so by only 55%? What makes the Brazilian 
immigrant predisposed to elect a radical candidate in large numbers? I hypothesized that 
discrimination, religion, and use of more narrowly owned or controlled media drive this particular 
electoral behavior. This theory is tested using a mix of light quantitative and heavy qualitative data 
collection. Interviews with participants help garner a more concrete understanding of how political 
conceptions are forged. I found that discrimination and political behavior were not directly linked, 
but indirectly related. Religion, specifically Christian institutions were indicators of a pro-
Bolsonaro stance. And the use of smaller media modes propounded undiluted thought to its 
recipients, expanding on their conservative views of the world.  
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Introduction 
Me disseram que eu voltei americanizada        They say I have come back Americanized 
Com o burro do dinheiro          By the stupid money 
Que estou muito rica…          That I got filthy rich 
…                    … 
Que já não tenho molho, ritmo, nem nada           That I no longer have swing, rhythm, or 
…             anything else 
Mas pra cima de mim, pra que tanto veneno?              … 
                                But why do they come with so much  
            spite over me? 
 
In 1940, Brazilian singer Carmen Miranda returned on a visit to Brazil after having 
immigrated to Hollywood. She was derided by the Brazilian press for having become 
Americanized. She responded to criticism with a new song: “Disseram que Voltei Americanizada” 
(They Say I Have Come Back Americanized).  Deeply affected by the opprobrium she received, 
Miranda did not return to Brazil for another fourteen years.1  
Carmen Miranda set the stage for what was to become a Brazilian diaspora. Her journey is 
symbolic of the wider migrant narrative: an individual transformed into a wanderer. Someone 
forever caught between two worlds, belonging to both partially but never entirely. That dilemma 
would come to the fore for millions of Brazucas (Brazilian immigrants/Brazilian-Americans) by 
the 1980s. At the tail-end of that century, more than one million Brazilians would leave Brazil and 
never return. The phenomenon of mass Brazilian immigration gained momentum in unprecedented 
numbers. A perceived vision or imagination of America was projected in the migrant conception: 
this nation was, for those who left Brazil, a land of “dreams.”2 Since that time, Massachusetts has 
become a home for hundreds of thousands of Brazilian wanderers. Cities such as Somerville, 
                                                
1 Bernadete Beserra. Brazilian Immigrants in the United States: Cultural Imperialism and Social Class (New York: 
LFB Scholarly Pub, 2003. Print). 
2 Alan P. Marcus. “Brazilian Immigration to the United States and the Geographical Imagination.” Geographical 
Review, vol. 99, no. 4, 2009, pp. 481–498. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40377412.  
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Boston, Framingham, and Marlborough can boast of a large Brazuca community. And in 
Marlborough, Brazilians make up a third of the total population.3  
 It is my own experience as a Brazilian immigrant that guides my search for a deeper and 
more meaningful understanding of Brazucas. My family and I settled in Massachusetts in the early 
2000’s. In a way, I am and will continue to be a product of the Brazilian diaspora. I comprehend 
the characteristic plight of an immigrant as someone who is never there nor here. It is in this vein 
that we craft a culture and a manner of being that is distinctive to us.4  
For better or for worse, we see the reverberations of this particular culture demonstrated in 
Brazuca politics. 86% of Brazilians living in Massachusetts showed their support for Jair 
Bolsonaro at the ballot box in the second round of the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections. This 
is in stark contrast to the general pattern evinced by Brazilian voters living in Brazil. Only 55% of 
those living in the home polity elected Bolsonaro for president. The question that arises here is: 
why and how did this fissure occur?  
A rationale that could possibly answer this curious case could be discrimination faced by 
the immigrant. This discrimination or “hardship” is multi-faceted and presents a series of 
difficulties for any migrant. What happens then? How might the immigrant “overcome”? A sound 
base of solace can be found in institutions and practices that help quell the disjuncture between an 
inclusionary past and an exclusionary present. For a Brazilian that institution is almost always the 
church, as has been noted by social scientists before.5 Compared to other immigrant populations 
with longer histories of diasporic migration, Brazilians have less developed community 
organizations. They almost entirely lack secular community organizations, made to provide 
                                                
3 Eliane Rubinstein-Avila. “Brazilian Portuguese in Massachusetts's Linguistic Landscape: A Prevalent Yet 
Understudied Phenomenon.” Hispania, vol. 88, no. 4, 2005, pp. 873–880. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20063216.  
4 Beserra 2003. 
5 Beserra 2003. 
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support and assistance in the host country. Instead, churches supplant that supportive communal 
need.6 “Churches, both Catholic and Protestant, often function as the main institution for “mutual 
support and solidarity.”7 Therefore, a politician that fits a religious mold similar to theirs is more 
amenable to the Brazilian immigrant. Indoctrinated by conservative Christian dogma, immigrants 
are more appreciative and supportive of a conservative candidate.8 
Another possibility that works in conjunction with the first is the rise in widespread 
disapproval of television conglomerates among Brazilians and a turning towards niche news 
media. Brazilian television stations are co-owned by hundreds of partners with differing political 
and religious views. They appease their wider populace and themselves by not only 
indiscriminately providing airtime to a varied array of political candidates, as per free electoral 
advertising laws, but do so without showing outward support for any contender. Niche news media 
such as radio and social media sites display a more concentrated point of view. Radio companies, 
Facebook pages, YouTube channels, and WhatsApp contacts are either owned or controlled by a 
select few who often carry the same religious and political views. Brazilian immigrants partaking 
in that media would very rarely receive any varying viewpoints.9 It would be logical to assume 
their conservative views would be bolstered and expanded.  
This study therefore posits the theory that overwhelming support for Jair Bolsonaro among 
Brazilian immigrants in Massachusetts stems from their experiences of discrimination, religious 
beliefs, and use of more narrowly owned or controlled sources of media. Stigmatization or 
                                                
6 Kara Beth Cebulko. Documented, Undocumented, and Something Else: The Incorporation of Children of Brazilian 
Immigrants (LFB Scholarly Pub. LLC, 2013). 
7 Maxine L. Margolis. 1994. Little Brazil: An Ethnography of Brazilian Immigrants in New York City (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press), 59. 
8 Benjamin G. Bishin and Casey A. Klofstad. “The Political Incorporation of Cuban Americans: Why Won't Little 
Havana Turn Blue?” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 65, no. 3, 2012, pp. 586–599. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/41635257. 
9 Taylor C. Boas. “Media Barons on the Ballot: Politically-Controlled Broadcasting in Brazil.” (2014). 
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“hardship” propels the migrant to seek a community. And as Brazucas tend to be lacking in secular 
institutions, these communities of solidarity and aid are found in churches. Churches, which often 
propagate conservative religious dogma, make congregates more predisposed to vote for a 
Christian leader. Conservative religious thought is then bolstered by the use of smaller media, 
including radio, Facebook, YouTube, and WhatsApp. This particular media deprives viewers of 
diverse political and social opinions. Overall, a combination of these conditions help to further 
radicalize the Brazilian immigrant. The design of this research uses both qualitative and 
quantitative data. A questionnaire gathers basic personal information. And then an interview 
process delves more deeply into participants’ personal stories, religious beliefs, political views, 
and social practices. The quantitative data works in tandem with the qualitative to better analyze 
the Brazilian immigrant and to create a dynamic picture of that particular community.  
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Background and Theory 
The Brazuca- An Overview 
 Brazucas are by definition referred to as either Brazilian immigrants of the United States 
or Brazilian-Americans. Their numbers have increased dramatically in the past thirty-five years. 
There are substantial communities in Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, California, and 
Florida. By the mid-2000’s, however, Massachusetts had surpassed New York, California, and 
Florida as the top destination for Brazilian immigration. And from 2000 to 2003, Brazilians in 
Massachusetts represented one out of every five immigrants. Now, Brazilians live in 250 of the 
350 towns and cities throughout Massachusetts. Geographically, they tend to conglomerate in three 
regions of the state: Cape Cod and the Islands, Boston and the North Shore, and the Metro West 
area and the South Shore. The vast majority are centered more in Boston and neighborhoods close-
by including Somerville, Everett, Marlborough and Framingham.10  
 This existent network between Brazil and Massachusetts predates the 1980s. Historically, 
we find the first linkages to have been forged during World War II. At the time, American 
engineers from Boston were sent to work in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais (often referred to 
as Minas). Many were living in the town of Governador Valadares, helping to construct a railroad 
that would link the coastal areas of the country to its land-bound “interior” regions. When these 
Boston-based engineers returned to the United States, they brought with them Brazilian domestic 
employees. The tie between Brazilians, especially Mineiros (those from the state of Minas Gerais), 
and Bostonians had been created. What bolstered that tie was the continued interest of Bostonian 
travelers in Brazilian geology especially. Those American employees had discovered something 
unknown to them: Minas Gerais (meaning “General Mines” in Portuguese) was a state rich in 
                                                
10 Cebulko 2013. 
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natural and expensive minerals. What proceeded in the following years were Boston residents 
frequently visiting Minas to purchase precious and semi-precious stones throughout the state. 
Seeing bands of Americans, a people seemingly more educated and wealthier, attracted Mineiros 
to the United States. The first Brazilian immigrants in Massachusetts found the state more 
amenable to their linguistic tastes, as its large and long-standing Portuguese community helped 
Brazilians communicate more easily with others. In conjunction, the fall of Brazil’s dictatorship 
in 1985 presented political and economic uncertainties. Further propelled by these issues, families 
and friends of those first migrants were persuaded to make the move. And by the 1980s, the 
community was beginning to grow more substantially across Massachusetts.11 
 However, despite the quick incremental growth of Brazilians in Massachusetts and 
throughout the United States, Brazilians have “received relatively little attention in the U.S. 
immigration literature thus far.”12 Nationally, the Brazuca community is estimated to be as large 
if not larger than the Cuban population and have already developed a second and third generation. 
But regardless of their size and protracted existence, relatively little is known about them.13 
Maxine Margolis, an anthropologist from the University of Florida posited that the Brazilian 
community in New York were an “invisible ingredient” in that city’s “melting pot.”14 Their 
description as an “invisible minority” holds not only in New York but throughout the country and 
in Boston as well. Brazilian residents are largely underrepresented in Census data. It is estimated 
that 80% of Brazilians were undercounted in the 1990 Census. And while the U.S. Census figures 
for 2000 provide a population estimate of 231,270, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims 
                                                
11 Cebulko 2013. 
12 Helen Marrow. “To Be or Not To Be (Hispanic or Latino): Brazilian Racial and Ethnic Identity in the United States.” 
Ethnicities 3.4 (2003): 427-64.  
13 Catarina Fritz. Brazilian Immigration and the Quest for Identity (LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2011). 
14 Margolis 1994. 
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there are 799,000 Brazucas in the United States. In Boston specifically, social scientists estimate 
that anywhere between 8% to 43% of Brazilian immigrants were not accounted for in the U.S. 
Census. Best estimates however range at about 29%. That would mean almost one-third of the 
entire Brazilian community of Boston and its surrounding environs is entirely unaccounted for by 
the United States government.15  
 Scholars argue that two primary reasons explain the widespread underrepresentation of 
Brazilian-Americans in demographic data. First, Brazilians are often difficult to categorize in 
ethnic or racial terms under the American system of categorization. They are often missed in 
Census classification. This mainly stems from the confusing wording of the ethnicity question: 
 
Is Person 1 of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?  
• No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin 
• Yes, Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano 
• Yes, Cuban 
• Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin – Print, for example, 
Salvadoran, Dominica, Colombian, Guatemalan, Spaniard, Ecuadorian, etc. 
This question presents a set of difficulties for the Brazuca, who comes from a country that 
is of Portuguese and not of Spanish or Hispanic origin. How then do Brazilians label themselves? 
Do they self-identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish? They will not be counted and included in 
data as a Brazilian if they answer “no.” Instead, they must opt for “yes” and write Brazilian in the 
box provided. However, most Brazucas would say “no” as the question seems to be asking whether 
that individual is of a Spanish-speaking nation. The following question on race does not give 
                                                
15 Fritz 2011. 
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Brazilians the chance to input their national origin, but instead they can only answer white, black, 
or Asian more generally.16 As Brazucas are typically lighter-skinned, not unlike other immigrants 
from Southern Cone countries (Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina), they tend to identify as 
white. Second, there exists large numbers of undocumented Brazilian immigrants. These 
populations are challenging and complicated to record in official Census data. Using statistics and 
figures collected by the Boston Metropolitan Immigrant Health & Legal Status Survey in 2007, 
estimates show that 71% of Brazilian adults in the Boston area are undocumented.17  
It is, one would theorize, a result of demographic underrepresentation that the Brazilian is 
also forgotten in academic scholarship. Latinos in America come from a vast array of different 
countries with their individual and unique histories, cultures, and traditions. But scholarship has 
tended to focus more on the experiences of Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans. This would 
make sense as Mexicans are easily demarcated for being characteristically “Hispanic, Latino, or 
of Spanish origin” based on their ethnic and racial traits.18 As per national policy, most Cubans 
who made it to U.S. soil were eligible for permanent residency after one year of living in the United 
States.19 And Puerto Ricans are Americans by birth, therefore, they have no issues regarding legal 
documentation. Brazilians are neither easily classified or generally documented. These features 
make them invisible to the government and to scholars. But the need to understand the experiences 
of other Hispanic and Latino groups is growing as these immigrants create and grow sizable 
communities throughout the United States. In fact, it is that very same interaction between 
                                                
16 US Census Bureau. “2020 Census Questionnaire.” The United States Census Bureau, 7 Mar. 2020,  
www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/technical-documentation/questionnaires/ 
2020.html. 
17 Cebulko 2013. 
18 Cebulko 2013. 
19 Bishin and Klofstad 2012. 
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academics and Brazilians in their own communities that has allowed for any scholarship on 
Brazucas to exist. Even this particular work would not have been possible without the work of 
scholars that came before me. Slowly, yet surely, the invisibility of the Brazilian is cast away. 
Here, we delve into a part of the Brazuca world left virtually unexplored by others: their electoral 
behavior. 
 
Background and Theory 
Interconnection Between Stigmatization, Religion, And Politics 
The experience of discrimination for the immigrant is an overarching one. It can take the 
role of explicit xenophobia, but it can also can come as result of one’s linguistic or educational 
limitations, socio-economic status, religious views and so on. Discrimination forces the migrant to 
make a choice: how will they cope? Some return to the homeland. Others forcibly assimilate. A 
vast majority however go in search of a group or a people that will accept them for who they are. 
That community is often their own.20  
We find this pattern in Germany, with its Turkish community. There, they suffer great 
discrimination. The host society deems Turkish-Muslims as “[un]fit to become German citizens” 
given their “unwilling[ness] to assimilate to [the] culture.” Under these circumstances, whereby 
the Turks are demonized for their religious practices, they look outwards for support. They often 
find it in radical and fundamentalist associations linked to the homeland.21 This argument mirrors 
that evinced by the Bolivian expat community. Over 88% of Bolivian emigrants (living in Brazil, 
                                                
20 Nedim Ögelman. “Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics among Germany's 
Turks.” The International Migration Review, vol. 37, no. 1, 2003, pp. 176. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/30037822. 
21 Ögelman 2003. 
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Argentina, the United States, and Spain) who declared having faced discrimination due to their 
national origins voted for Evo Morales, a radical populist. This was a choice influenced by political 
conversations between Bolivian emigrants in the host country and non-emigrants in the home 
nation.22  
We find that the Brazilian-American suffers discrimination based on anti-immigrant 
sentiment, legalization status, linguistic limitations, and socio-economic constraints. And as noted 
earlier, Brazilians have limited avenues of expressing national or ethnic solidarity as they have 
less-developed secular organizations. Therefore, it is almost always a Christian church that serves 
the communal needs of Brazucas.23  
The Latino/Hispanic categories of racial and ethnic classifications have become 
increasingly stigmatized since the late twentieth century. Brazilians would fall under this particular 
category. Along with a band of other nationalities, the greater Latin American world is spuriously 
surmised as being “poor” and its migrants as “illegals.” And unfortunately, a majority of Brazilians 
(71% in Boston and percentages we can only approximate in other parts of the country) are 
undocumented. 24 The stigma associated with being undocumented hinders droves of Brazilians 
from acquiring white-collar, high-paying jobs. They are forced to labor with menial tasks, 
sometimes in stark contrast to their previous occupations in Brazil. Here, they speak very little or 
no English at all. Day-to-day communication is an arduous task. These immigrants are of the 
working-class and have little money to splurge on anything except necessities. “He is a trapped 
individual, he has no liberty to do what he likes.”25 But the disparity between their professions and 
                                                
22 Jean-Michel Lafleur and María Sánchez-Domínguez. “The political choices of emigrants voting in home country 
elections: A socio-political analysis of the electoral behaviour of Bolivian external voters.” Migration Studies 3.2 
(2015): 155-181. 
23 Beserra 2003. 
24 Cebulko 2013. 
25 Beserra 2003, 104. 
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backgrounds in Brazil in contrast to their lives and ways of life in America becomes a problem not 
only for the individual at hand but for churches as well. Churches work to motivate migrants to 
pursue their goals in an alien country. It becomes a meeting place for all. It transforms into a 
therapeutic center for the dislocated and disenfranchised. It supplies entertainment for those with 
socio-economic limitations. Many who work all week long have no time or disposable income to 
spend on activities of leisure and relaxation. Churches freely provide that need for enjoyment.26   
How do these Christian institutions relate to politics? As we have already established, 
Brazilian immigrants come to the United States and in the face of discrimination they find 
solidarity in the church. The church preaches an uplifting yet unifying message of hope. That 
unification creates a like-minded populace. And that like-minded populace will tend to believe and 
do similar things. This is a simple summary of a social phenomenon we see elsewhere. Cuban 
Americans, for example, a subset of Latinos that were barred from practicing their religion under 
Castro, became ardent Republicans when they immigrated to the United States. The desire to 
maintain a group feeling, in this case, remaining practitioners of the Christian faith, is preserved 
through same party identification.27 This is not to say that Cuban-Americans and Brazilian-
Americans are identical. Brazilians were never denied the right to be Christians in Brazil. But not 
unlike the Cubans, the institution of the Christian church united them in times of discrimination. 
Cuban immigrants found the religiously conservative party to be more amenable to their tastes. 
Similarly, Brazilians found Jair Bolsonaro, running under a traditionalist Christian banner, more 
receptive to their own identities. Religious life for migrants is a cornerstone of their livelihood.28 
                                                
26 Beserra 2003. 
27 Bishin and Klofstad 2012. 
28 Patricia Landolt. “The Transnational Geographies of Immigrant Politics: Insights from a Comparative Study of 
Migrant Grassroots Organizing.” The Sociological Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 1, 2008, pp. 53–77. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/40220057. 
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A candidate who propagates that reality more explicitly than his or her competitor is able to 
successfully influence the greatest number of churches. And as churches are synonymous with 
Brazilian communities, that candidate will most likely win the Brazuca vote.   
 
Background and Theory 
Interconnection Between the Media and Politics 
 That initial political spur (in this case, a conservative leaning) created and bolstered by the 
relationship between discrimination and religion is further accentuated by the use of media. Here, 
it is the continued use of niche media modes that helps shape politically conservative thought.  
 Data collected in Brazil may point to a similar reality among Brazilians in the United States. 
The power of media is undeniable. During his time as the senator of São Paulo, the future 34th 
President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, specifically mentioned the power of television 
in relation to politics. For him, a political campaign would be most successful if that candidate had 
the backing and support of a TV channel. And as recent scholarship has shown, the value of media 
is not to be diminished. It continues to be important and central to molding election results. 
However, the successful use of media on electoral behavior does depend on its mode.29  
 We see that certain types of media are more successful than others. Television, for example, 
perhaps a giant in the political world during Cardoso’s senatorial term, holds minimal sway in vote 
share today. Ties to a TV channel provide no significant electoral benefits for candidates. In 
contrast, radio stations with ties to a particular political candidate increased that individual’s 
chance of winning an election by a surprising 28%. What sets these two modes of media apart? 
How is one much more successful than the other? A viable explanation is that radio stations have 
                                                
29 Boas 2014. 
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concentrated ownership and management while television channels do not. Any particular TV 
station might be owned by hundreds of partners. These stations are then subject to constant 
oversight. Politicians can never be portrayed too negatively or too positively. Political points of 
view must be watered down to appease co-partners of the station and its viewers. While, radio 
stations examined in particular rural regions of Brazil were shown to have no more than 8 co-
partners. Radio broadcasters could thus more easily and explicitly exude their political 
preferences.30  
 The heightened use of social media has drastically changed methods of partaking in 
political thought. One could hypothesize that radio stations would be analogous to Facebook posts 
or WhatsApp messages. Any one particular Facebook user can create a channel and use that outlet 
to reach a large population. Any one particular WhatsApp user can share videos and pictures with 
everyone in their contacts. There is no oversight. Undiluted ideas can be shared indiscriminately. 
The effects of that can be mind-boggling. Scholarship on this phenomenon is new and still working 
itself out. But, research has pointed to the power of YouTube’s recommendation engine as a 
powerful force in diverting users to far-right political content. The software is designed to 
maximize watch time, and it does so successfully by drawing people in with stories and theories 
rooted in anger, doubt, and fear. These emotions, as experts have suggested, are characteristic of 
right-wing extremism.31 Likewise, one can posit that the political beliefs of Brazilian immigrants 
will be similarly shaped by smaller media modes, such as YouTube. While in contrast, the sway 
of larger corporate networks will have little to no effect on electoral behavior.  
 
                                                
30 Boas 2014. 
31 Max Fisher and Amanda Taub. “How YouTube Radicalized Brazil.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 
12 Aug. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/world/americas/youtube-brazil.html?auth=login-email&login=email. 
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Research and Design 
Organization 
 While this study delves deep into the electoral behavior of Brazucas, the research has its 
limitations. Its results are not created to generalize every Brazilian community throughout the 
United States. But instead, it focuses on understanding the Brazilian in Massachusetts specifically. 
A mix of quantitative and qualitative data was employed to better understand the voting behavior 
of that particular community. While quantitative information might more easily present a general 
representation of its intended sample, it often fails to fully comprehend the “why.” The “why” 
requires discussion and socialization between the researcher and its sample subjects in a way that 
seeks to understand the participant. Qualitative studies have been denoted as the best indicators of 
“perceptions, attitudes, and processes.” This form of “micro-level studies” allows researchers to 
bring better responses that will more fully answer questions of acculturation, settlement, and 
cultural transfer.32 
 The overall conception of this research design was adopted by a study conducted in São 
Paulo. Researcher Marcela Tanaka, from the University of Campinas, sought to understand the 
relationship between evangelicals, the use of media, and the formation of political opinions. That 
study incorporated a recruitment period followed by the use of focus groups to qualitatively 
analyze the interrelation between religion, media, and electoral behavior.33 This project employs 
similar methods to answer a similar question.  
For this study, points of recruitment were set at four different venues. These are popular 
locales prominent within the Brazilian community that are customarily visited by many Brazilians 
                                                
32 Marcus 2009. 
33 Marcela Tanaka. Política, Religião E Mídia. A formação de preferências do eleitor evangélico. 2019. Universidade 
Estadual De Campinas, PhD dissertation.  
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on a daily basis. The first two were in Marlborough. One was the Mineirão Market located at 530 
Boston Post Road E. And the other was Delanas Bakery on 44 Main Street. The latter two were in 
Framingham: Tesoros Supermarket located on 80 Hollis Street and Tropical Cafe on 85 Hollis 
Street. The study was organized in a manner that required the recruiter to stand inside the venues, 
in close proximity to the entrance. Therefore, interaction could occur more easily and recruitment 
could be more successful. To use the venues for research purposes required written documentation 
evincing agreement from the owners of these four institutions. This presented a difficulty that took 
weeks to resolve as owners often deliberated on their signatures. But, by the beginning of March, 
recruitment had begun.   
After delays related to IRB approval, securing permission from recruiting locales, and 
determining suitable places to hold each meeting, the focus groups were planned for mid-March. 
They had been scrupulously organized. There were to be 6 sets of groups with approximately 10 
participants in each. At the start of each group, a full questionnaire with 7 questions would be 
provided to all participants. Questions asked for gender, age, voter preference in the 2018 Brazilian 
presidential election, educational attainment level, experience of discrimination faced in the past 
12 months, level of discrimination (on a scale of 0-10), and religious affiliation.  
Groups would be composed of an equal number of men and women. Participants should 
be heterogeneous in nature, with respondents having variable ages, experiences of discrimination, 
and religious affiliations. Group 1, would have all voted for Bolsonaro in the 2018 presidential 
election. Group 2 would consist of those who did not vote for Bolsonaro in the election would be 
chosen to participate here. Groups 3 and 4 would be of the same composition as Groups 1 and 2, 
however questions posed would be focused on religiosity, so as to gauge the importance of 
religious affiliation on voting behavior. Groups 5 and 6 would follow similarly in the same 
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footsteps, however here respondents would be asked questions regarding xenophobia in the United 
States so to better understand how levels of oppression affect Brazilian voters in Massachusetts. 
The latter four were deemed as experimental groups. Groups 3 and 4 were to be shown Christian 
tinged political media. Groups 5 and 6 were to be shown anti-immigrant American news. Doing 
so would not only seek to understand if religion and xenophobia had a role in the conception of 
Brazilian electoral thought but also to gauge whether that particular media had the ability to alter 
political conceptions. 
 
 
Research and Design 
Alterations and Application 
The overall projection of this research design was turned on its head in a matter of days. 
As a direct result of COVID-19, in the short window of time between mid to late March, the 
governor of Massachusetts, Charlie Baker, established state laws to limit the number of people in 
any given gathering to ten. At that juncture, the research design was forced to be altered. There 
was an option to conduct focus groups online. However, that presented a series of difficulties 
whereby participants might not have had access to webcam capabilities or been capable of setting 
up conference-meeting software. Therefore, in-person focus groups were replaced with individual 
interviews. These were conducted via phone. And most of the features of the initial research design 
remained the same. 
An objective of the study had been to recruit 120 participants and to use approximately 
sixty. These sixty were to be separated into 6 sections with 10 people in each group. Half of those 
groups would consist of Bolsonaristas (supporters of Bolsonaro) and the other half of non-
Bolsonaristas. Unfortunately, recruitment was forced to end with the rise of COVID-19. At that 
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time, there was not even a sufficient number of participants that could allow for six distinct groups. 
And while there was a plentiful amount of Bolsonaro supporters, there were very few non-
Bolsonaristas. In total, there were 38 participants that had been recruited. 32 of them were chosen 
to partake in the study, as per the gender balance. There were 16 women and 16 men. Names of 
all participants were codified to ensure their confidentiality. First names were replaced by 
pseudonyms. Respondents were separated into 3 groups. Group 1 (G1) was designated as the 
control group. Group 2 (G2) was designated as the “religious group” as they would be shown 
religious media. And Group 3 (G3) was designated as the “xenophobic group” as they would be 
shown American xenophobic news. Groups were organized using random selection. 12 
participants were placed in control; 10 participants in the religious group; 10 in the xenophobic 
group. There was an even number of women and men in each group.  
Questionnaire questions remained the same and were asked to all participants at the 
beginning of calls. The script intended to be used for the focus groups were reused in the 
interviews, as only personal directions to the researcher made explicit reference to the group 
dynamic. The interview questions themselves were devoid of any reference to any inkling of group 
discussion or group dialogue. Both the questionnaire (in English and in Portuguese), along with 
the focus group/interview questions are provided in the Appendix. Individuals in all three groups 
were asked the same 7 interview questions split into 3 sections. The first section, or introduction, 
consisted of getting to know the participant and their views of what constituted an ideal political 
candidate. Section two was an evaluation of socialization methods and their impact on political 
knowledge and formation of preferences. The final section, or conclusion, ended with returning to 
a question posited in section 1: “if you could describe the perfect political candidate, how would 
they be?”  
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G2 and G3 differed from G1 in that there was the addition of a new section placed before 
the conclusion. Questions posited to participants in G2 sought to evaluate the impact of religious 
media on participants. Two YouTube videos were shown. The videos captured Bolsonaro’s 
interrelation with the Christian community in Brazil. Questions asked in G3 tried to evaluate the 
impact of xenophobic American news on interviewees. Two videos posted on YouTube were 
shown that captured a rise of anti-immigrant sentiment in American politics.  
Summary of Video 1 for G2 (religious group) 
In October of 2019, Bolsonaro addressed an evangelical coalition in the lower 
house of Congress. There, he indicated he would replace two retiring Supreme 
Court Justices (Celso de Mello e Marco Aurélio Mello) with ministers who are 
“terribly evangelical… because this Spirit must be present in all [political] 
branches.”34  
Summary of Video 2 for G2 (religious group) 
After winning the presidential election, Bolsonaro (a Catholic) and his wife, 
Michelle (an evangelical Christian) attend an evangelical church service in 
November of 2018. His wife is a member of this particular church. Bolsonaro 
presents a short speech in which he posits: “Using my military background, I want 
to follow in the footsteps of Duque de Caxias, the pacifist. I will be putting God on 
top of everything and helping those who need Him.”35 
 
 
                                                
34 “Jair Bolsonaro indicará ministro 'terrivelmente evangélico.’” YouTube, uploaded by Band Jornalismo, 10 July 
2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n5-PZ-JOCic&t=1s. 
35 “Bolsonaro vai a culto evangélico e diz que pretende seguir passos de Duque de Caxias.” YouTube, uploaded by 
Jovem Pan News, 5 November 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3phk35MD1eg. 
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 Summary of Video 1 for G3 (xenophobic group) 
A Brazilian news-segment on American immigration: it explained that as of July of 
2019, the United States had altered its deportation laws. Immigrants who did not 
have a visa could be deported in a matter of days instead of months or years. And 
those who could not prove they had lived in the United States for at least two 
uninterrupted years could be expelled without passing through an immigration 
tribunal.36 
 Summary of Video 2 for G3 (xenophobic group) 
Another Brazilian news-segment explicating a meeting between Donald Trump and 
members of the U.S. Congress. The encounter occurred in January of 2018 and 
Trump was quoted to have said: “why should the United States accept immigrants 
from *shithole* countries?” The president was referring to those coming from 
Haiti, El Salvador, and Africa.37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 “Novas regras que ampliam deportação imediata de imigrantes nos EUA.” YouTube, uploaded by tvbrasil, 23 July 
2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l1qZyphWI3E. 
37 “Trump usa palavras ofensivas contra imigrantes.” YouTube, uploaded by afpbr, 12 January 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u5I2BzL9X1w&feature=youtu.be. 
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Data 
Exposition of Quantitative Answers 
 The first collection of graphics consists of charts showing questionnaire responses. Here, 
basic data collected from the 32-person population sample is reproduced. Included are breakdowns 
of participants by age group, voter preference, educational attainment level, and religious 
affiliation. 
Age Group Breakdown of Respondents 
Source: Close-ended survey questionnaire. Question: “What is your age?” 
 
 
Voter Preference (in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Election) of Respondents 
 
Source: Close-ended survey questionnaire. Question: “Who did you vote for you in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential 
election?” 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69
(General)
0 5 10 15 20 25
Jair	Bolsonaro	(PSL)
Fernando	Haddad	(PT)
Other:
(General)
Nunes 26 
Educational Attainment Level of Respondents 
 
Source: Close-ended survey questionnaire. Question: “What is your highest educational attainment level?” 
 
 
 
Religious Affiliation of Respondents 
Source: Close-ended survey questionnaire. Question: “What is your religious affiliation?” 
 
 
  Ages of participants ranged from 25 years old to 69 years old. The average participant is 
45.28 years old, has a 78.1% chance of being pro-Bolsonaro, an 84.4% chance of having completed 
at least a secondary education, and has a 90.6% chance of being a Christian (either evangelical or 
Catholic).  
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Data 
Demonstrative Ability to Change 
On a cognizant level, Brazilians argue that political conversations hold no meaningful sway 
on their electoral beliefs. Of the 32 participants, 26 of them, or 81.3%, believed that these 
conversations have no impact on their political thoughts.  
 
Brazilian Perception on Personal Political Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “Do you think these conversations have an impact on 
what you think politically?” 
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 However, there exists a disjuncture between cognizant and subconscious change. The 
political affinities and conceptions of participants showed alterations even in the span of a short 
10 to 60-minute interview. When asked to describe the characteristics of a perfect political 
candidate at the beginning and at the end of the interviews, Brazilians responded differently no 
matter the group. Experimental groups G2 and G3 saw more protracted change, but even those in 
G1 offered different answers. 
 
Variation in Political Thought from Beginning of Interview to End, G1 (Control) 
Characteristics of A Perfect Candidate 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “describe the perfect political candidate.” 
 
 
 Although the interviews were shorter, by the end of the conversation, interviewees in G1 
placed less importance on upholding the rule of law, political moderation, and honesty. Instead, 
they focused on the centrality of a Christian background, the ability to stabilize the economy or 
create jobs, and institute better domestic policy. Opinions on social policy remained the same.  
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Variation in Political Thought from Beginning of Interview to End, G2 (Religious) 
Characteristics of A Perfect Candidate 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “describe the perfect political candidate.” 
 
 
Conversations in G2 focused on aspects of religion in conjunction to politics. We see 
therefore, a rise in the importance of a Christian background, upholding the rule of law, the ability 
to stabilize the economy or create jobs, and political moderation. Opinions on social policy and 
honesty remained the same.   
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Variation in Political Thought from Beginning of Interview to End, G3 (Xenophobic) 
Characteristics of A Perfect Candidate 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “describe the perfect political candidate.” 
 
 
 
 Questions posed to G3 participants centered on American xenophobia and discrimination. 
There is less focus on the leader’s Christian background and honesty. And there is more need that 
the leader be able to stabilize the economy or create jobs, and institute better domestic and social 
policy. Opinions on rule of law and political moderation are unchanged.  
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Data 
Understand How Change Can Take Place 
 If change can take place on a micro-level it can also occur on the macro-level. To 
understand the Brazilian immigrant, and how their social and political conceptions are forged and 
altered, we must understand where, with whom, and how does the Brazilian immigrant interact. 
These interactions form the petri dish of thought.  
 
Spaces of Socialization 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “In what spaces do you socialize most often?” 
 
 
 
 
How Political Conversations Take Place 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “In those spaces  
[of socialization] … do you discuss politics?... With who? 
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Receives News Through 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “Do you watch the news… [through] social media, 
radio television? Which ones?” 
 
Frequency of News Intake 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “Do you watch the news? How 
frequently?” 
 
 
A participant will generally use social media (34.4%) to socialize or will do so physically 
in church (29.7%). The vast majority of political conversations (72.7%) will take place directly 
with family and friends. Many receive news through either television (41.9%) or social media 
(32.3%). And 75% watch, read, or hear the news all the time, meaning various times a day. 
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Data 
Religious Group Breakdown 
Frequency of Religious Media Intake 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “How often do you watch, hear, or read religious 
media?” 
 
 
 
 
Video 1 For G2 
Purposefully Nominating Someone Who Is Evangelical to the Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “How did you feel about the media shown to you?” 
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Video 2 For G2 
Bolsonaro Following in the Footsteps of a Former Brazilian Military General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “How did you feel about the media shown to you?” 
 
  
G2 participants demonstrated an interest in religion as 80% of them are at least sometimes 
partaking in religious media. After asking respondents how they felt about Jair Bolsonaro 
purposefully nominating an evangelical judge to the Supreme Court, 50% defended the President’s 
plan. Only 20% of them disapproved. Additionally, participants in G2 showed support for 
Bolsonaro’s vow to try and emulate the work of a former military general, Duque de Caxias. 60% 
of interviewees agreed. And 30% of them disagreed.  
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Data 
Xenophobic Group Breakdown 
 
Video 1 For G3 
Alterations to Deportation Laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “How did you feel about the media shown to you?” 
 
 
 
 
 
Video 2 For G3 
Trump’s Harsh Criticism of Africa, El Salvador, And Haiti  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question: “How did you feel about the media shown to you?” 
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Xenophobic Broadcasters/Politicians Using the Media for Political Purposes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Coding of qualitative interview responses. Question(s): “What do you think of xenophobic broadcasters 
using media for political ends? What do you think of xenophobic politicians using media for political ends?” 
 
 
 As a community of immigrants, it is somewhat surprising that 80% of participants agree 
with alterations to deportation laws that limit deportation times to days instead of years. 10% of 
them disagreed. Not surprisingly, 90% of interviewees disagreed with Trump’s discriminatory 
remarks against Africa, El Salvador, and Haiti. No participant agreed. In conjunction, 80% 
disagreed with broadcasters and politicians using the media to evince anti-immigrant sentiment.  
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Analysis 
Stigmatization, Religion, and Politics 
It would seem that the theory of a direct interrelation between discrimination and religion 
might not necessarily be always true.  
 
Relationship Between Discrimination and Voter Preference 
 
 
 Most surprisingly we find that even given certain political and social hostilities against 
Hispanic/Latinos, 87.5% of Brazilians do not report having experienced discrimination in the past 
year. Moreover, 78.6% of those that reported having experienced “no” discrimination voted for 
Bolsonaro compared to 75% of those that had faced discrimination. It would seem, based on this 
data, that those who did not experience discrimination are actually more predisposed to have voted 
for Jair Bolsonaro by a margin of 3.6%. 
 But this is where the importance of qualitative research presents itself. It is arguable that 
the quantitative research question pertaining to that point in the study was flawed: it was too 
narrow. It was written as follows: “experience of discrimination in the host country (in the past 12 
months)?” However, the question was trying to understand the overall effects of discrimination or 
difficulty in the host country as indicative of a communal need. Participants understood 
“discrimination” to only mean some explicit demonstration of xenophobia instead of the 
experience of “hardship” that makes acculturation an arduous task. Although the quantitative data 
indicates that the electoral behavior of Brazilians is not swayed by discriminatory experiences, the 
Experience of 
Discrimination 
(within last 12 months) 
Pro-
Bolsonaro 
Pro-
Haddad/Other 
% Pro-Bolsonaro 
Yes 3 1 75 
No 22 6 78.6 
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qualitative interview questions and answers provide a somewhat different argument. Answers 
pertaining to discrimination or difficulty came up at various points throughout the long and drawn-
out conversations. 
 
“When you come as an immigrant, you already know you are going to go through many 
difficulties. You have to be mentally prepared to suffer. I came to America with this 
coldness in my heart. So, it was easier for me, mentally, to overcome these difficulties.” 
(Barbara) 
 
“In the beginning, it was very difficult to leave a culture behind and move to a land you do 
not know. For 20 years, you see, it has been a struggle.” (Junior) 
 
“In the beginning, it was very difficult. I did not speak English. I was undocumented and 
lived with 6 people in one room.” (Diego) 
 
“In the beginning, it was difficult because we did not speak English. And we could feel 
that people were discriminating us because we could not speak the language.” (Ana 
Carolina) 
 
“They think that because I am white, I’m American. But when they discover I’m from 
somewhere else, they treat me differently.” (Lorena) 
 
“I had an ex-boss who discriminated me.” (Sofia) 
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“I was driving a truck and some American got near me and said ‘I’m going to call 
immigration on you.’” (Davi) 
 
“I was discriminated by some redneck Americans. At the time, I worked at a Dunkin 
Donuts and always talked to other employees in Portuguese. One day some customers said 
‘this is America, you have to speak English.’ The funny thing is, we were not even standing 
close to them. They were so uncomfortable with us they shouted from a distance.” (Lucas) 
 
“I was the only Brazilian at my high school. The discrimination was explicit. Nobody 
looked like me. I felt excluded.” (Zaqueu) 
 
“I know that people look at me differently because I’m an immigrant. But I am not really 
affected. They have the right to hate me. I am the one living here illegally.” (Raquel) 
 
“I’m afraid to walk on the street because I am illegal here.” (Luisa) 
 
“I have had problems because I am not documented.” (Gustavo) 
 
“I came through Mexico. I had difficulties with English” (Brenda) 
 
“My difficulties stem from not knowing the English language.” (Anna) 
 
“My main difficulty was the language.” (Fred) 
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“I have difficulties with English because I only communicate with Brazilians.” (Caio) 
 
“Adapting has not been easy. I still do not speak English.” (Diane) 
 
  What matters here is understanding the Brazilian conception of what constitutes 
“stigmatization.” Participants exhibited a general nonchalance at their personal hardships. These 
stories were not told with sadness or in anger but with complete indifference. It was as if they were 
talking about the weather. For many there was a belief that this suffering was to be expected and 
that living in America, even given its difficulties, was preferable to living in Brazil. From here 
arises the notion that these problems are initial barriers inherent to the plight of the immigrant that 
must be overcome. In so doing, the immigrant inches closer to achieving the “American dream.” 
 
“We came here for better conditions, ones that Brazil cannot offer us, and because of the 
violence there. There are more opportunities here. We have our own money.” (Brenda) 
 
“The quality of life, security, health care, and opportunities are better here.” (Diane) 
 
“I love the dignity this country gives to its people. I came here looking for money and to 
better my life. And here, I discovered something else. The importance of life over money. 
For the first time in my life, I discovered what dignity was.” (Gustavo) 
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“But slowly we begin to evolve and life gets better. I went to college and began earning 
more. I purchased a house. And now I live the ‘American dream.’” (Diego) 
 
Choosing to stay requires that the immigrant establishes their roots here. And while the 
outside American world may be critical of their personal identities as undocumented immigrants, 
non-English speakers, and members of the working class, there is an institution that accepts them: 
a Christian church. 29 participants, or 90.6% of them were self-labeled as Christian (either 
evangelical or Catholic). And 19 participants or 59.3% of interviewees mentioned the church as 
one of their primary places of socialization. The 17 participants who recounted their stories of 
discrimination or difficulty and the 4 who talked of their appreciation for the United States are all 
Bolsonaristas. And all but one are Christian. While there might not be a cognizant linkage between 
discrimination and religion in the minds of Brazilians, the church is integral to providing a 
communal space for the Brazuca.  
Between Bolsonaristas and Christians however, there does exist an explicit statistical 
interconnection. We see this especially among evangelicals where all but one voted for Bolsonaro.  
 
Relationship Between Religious Affiliation and Voter Preference 
Religious Affiliation Pro-Bolsonaro Pro-Haddad/ 
Other 
% Pro-Bolsonaro 
Christian/Protestant 
Evangelical 
19 1 95 
Catholic 5 4 55.5 
Atheist/ Agnostic/ 
I don’t believe in God 
1 1 50 
Other 0 1 0 
 
Based on national demographic data collected in the 2010 Brazilian Census, Christians 
constitute 86.8% of the entire population. Therefore, the difference between the number of 
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Christians among the sample population of Brazilian immigrants (90.6%) and of those in Brazil 
(86.8%) is marginal (3.8%), especially when compared to the disparity between support for 
Bolsonaro in the home polity (55%) versus the host polity (86%). The 31% margin would lend 
itself to the theory that the experience of immigration makes Brazilians more religious. And 
although we do not necessarily see this explicitly demonstrated in the rate of Christianity, we see 
this more in the categorization of Brazilian Christians. Catholics make up 64.6% of the national 
populace in Brazil while evangelicals account for 22.2%.38 In contrast, among the sample 
population in the United States that ratio is reversed. Of 32 participants, 20 were evangelicals and 
only 9 were Catholics. Evangelicals thus constitute 62.5% of the sample while Catholics make up 
only 28%. This is not entirely surprising as there has been a rise of Evangelical Protestants among 
the Hispanic/Latino population. Although Catholicism remains dominant within the broader 
Latino community, a growing number have joined evangelical churches. Today evangelicalism is 
becoming the largest alternative to the Catholic Church among Latinos.39  
While Catholic churches might continue to exist as centers of solidarity for Brazilians, 
evangelical institutions are beginning to supplant that need on a broader scale. Evangelical 
churches are becoming the largest propagators of support and solidarity in the host nation. And as 
exhibited by the data collected, Brazilian evangelicals in Massachusetts are more supportive of 
Bolsonaro in contrast to their Catholic counterparts. 95% of evangelicals in the sample voted were 
Pro-Bolsonaro compared to only 55.5% of Catholics. This rise in evangelicalism therefore 
accounts for Bolsonaro’s success among Brazucas. 
                                                
38 Reinaldo Azevedo. “O IBGE e a Religião - Cristãos São 86,8% Do Brasil; Católicos Caem Para 64,6%; Evangélicos 
Já São 22,2%: Reinaldo Azevedo.” VEJA, VEJA, 18 Feb. 2017, veja.abril.com.br/blog/reinaldo/o-ibge-e-a-religiao-
cristaos-sao-86-8-do-brasil-catolicos-caem-para-64-6-evangelicos-ja-sao-22-2/. 
39 Jongho Lee and Harry P. Pachon. “Leading the Way: An Analysis of the Effect of Religion on the Latino 
Vote.” American Politics Research, vol. 35, no. 2, Mar. 2007, pp. 252–272, doi:10.1177/1532673X06295300. 
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How then does this evangelical community shape the political perceptions of Brazilian 
immigrants? Even in this conservative environment there exists a predisposition for change. This 
is a population that once supported the left wing, social democratic, Worker’s Party (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores, PT) in past Brazilian presidential elections. 
 
“In the past I voted for the PT.” (Caio, an evangelical) 
“I voted for Dilma. She was a perfect political candidate at the time.” (Diane, an evangelical) 
“Even I voted for Lula. I thought he was going to change Brazil.” (Barbara, an evangelical) 
“When Lula took power, he was a great guy” (Diego, an evangelical) 
 
But now, that very same population is mostly anti-PT and pro-Bolsonaro. On one level, this 
stems from the desire to elect a leader who they identify with. This comes from Bolsonaro’s 
religious views and propagation of those views throughout his campaign. They see Bolsonaro as 
someone who is similar to them: a Christian following religious precepts. 
  
“The country only has to win with God in front of everything.” (Isabella, an evangelical) 
 
“Evangelicals are more humane. With God in their hearts, they will be more just.” (Anna, an 
evangelical) 
 
“Bolsonaro won because he was against teaching children something he knows is bad. Should 
my five-year son be taught that something immoral is correct? Things that the Bible are 
against.” (Bruno, an evangelical) 
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On another level, we see religiosity blending together with social conservatism. This leaves a 
population more desiring of strict adherence to tradition, law, and order. They posit a new regime, 
a new form of government, will achieve that desired social conservatism.  
 
“It is good to be like Duque de Caxias because Brazil is not properly governed. Because, people 
are not following the laws. With (Bolsonaro’s) convictions in God, he will ask God for 
guidance and will not deviate from the law.” (Brenda, an evangelical) 
 
“I have my conclusions about the past regimes [the military dictatorships], and they were not 
authoritarian. At the time, there was respect to the family, to the self, and to property. But 
everything was lost when democrats took power. Bolsonaro is trying to redeem the 
government. He wants to counteract everything bad, the ‘gayzistas, abortistsas, e toda coisa 
ruim desta terra’ (gays, pro-choice advocates, and everything bad on this planet).” (Gustavo, 
an evangelical) 
 
Even in matters pertaining to anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States, they prioritize rule 
of law over themselves. It has been noted in academic scholarship that Brazilian Christian churches 
uphold secular law as they do sacred law. Members of churches who might have been 
undocumented at any given time during their membership, have suggested that they were subject 
to discrimination from other legalized congregates. This stems from the fear of having the image 
of a Christian institution connected to the practice of “illegal immigration.” Brazilian Christians 
Nunes 45 
accept the idea that laws are correct no matter who they are intended to benefit.40 One of the 
participants, a full-time evangelical pastor, shared her beliefs on secular immigration laws in a way 
that mirrors the argument posited above.  
 
“Deportation is the law of the country. Executors of law are in their authority. For example, 
when I administer the Bible and there is a [secular] professional that tries to influence my 
religious thought, I will not agree. Therefore, as a pastor I have no say in legal matters. It is 
not my place. Some immigrants want to disobey laws and practice crimes.” (Pamela, an 
evangelical) 
 
 
Analysis 
Media and Politics 
Relationship Between Viewership of Smaller News Outlets and Voter Preference 
Use of News 
Outlet 
Pro-Bolsonaro Pro-
Haddad/Other 
Total % Pro-
Bolsonaro 
Smaller (social 
media, 
blogs/local news, 
radio) 
14 3 17 82.4 
Larger 
(television and 
news 
applications) 
11 3 14 78.6 
 
                                                
40 Beserra 2003. 
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Although 14 participants, or 45.2% of respondents, in the experimental groups (G2 and 
G3) admitted to watching the news on television or digital news applications, various interviewees 
said they vehemently disagreed with what they watched. 
The main company of contention was Globo, owned by Grupo Globo, the largest mass 
media company of Latin America. Most Brazilians grew-up watching Globo and only Globo, as 
this was most often the only available channel to middle-class and working-class families. Due to 
their upbringing, most Brazilian immigrants have not deviated from this cultural practice. 
Nonetheless, for many the practice remains only a ritualistic one. Participants showed a disdain 
for Globos politicization of the news, but admitted to watching it or using its phone application to 
keep themselves updated. They noted especially their continued viewership of Jornal Nacional, or 
“National News,” aired by Globo. 
 
“Globo hates Bolsonaro. But today everything is very biased. So, I disagree with the Jornal 
Nacional, but it’s enjoyable to see.” (Diego) 
 
“I watch Globo, but it is always trying to criticize the president. They have an agenda.” 
(Igor) 
 
“I watch the Jornal Nacional every day, but I really do not like Globo.” (Anna) 
 
 In contrast, 17 respondents or 54.8% of interviewees used social media, blogs, local news 
sites, and radio as channels of news collection. They said these media modes were more conducive 
to their world views. And not unlike radio networks which often have low-ownership count, social 
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media accounts, blogs, and local news sites are also controlled or owned by a small number of 
people. Most are run by individuals or a small group of people that are able to propound undiluted 
ideas. These undiluted ideas bolster what individuals have already been taught elsewhere.  
 
“I watch YouTube videos every day.” (Caio) 
 
“I watch the news only through social media. YouTube. Three to four times a day.” 
(Gustavo) 
 
“I usually just use social media. Mainly Facebook and WhatsApp.” (Raquel) 
 
“Globo is fake news. I use Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram.” (Barbara)  
 
“I listen to the radio. Once a day.” (Zaqueu) 
 
Participants espoused hesitancy to engage in political dialogue with anyone who would 
disagree with them. We see this with the disparity of social media as a common method of general 
socialization but not as a common method of interacting in political dialogue. 34.4% of participants 
socialized using social media. But, only 18.2% of participants engaged in political conversation 
more generally on these sites. Instead, 72.7% of interviewees responded to feeling comfortable 
having political discussions directly with family and friends. They opt for more limited political 
thoughts and ideas instead of risking “being divisive” and “starting fights.”  
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“Political conversations are not really my style. Everyone has their own preference, and 
every time you talk about it there’s a fight.” (Fred) 
 
 “I don’t talk about politics. It’s not very good to be talking about politics. You know 
what happens, right?” (Gabriel) 
 
“I try not to talk about politics. People take it to personally. Many people have closed 
minds. So, I don’t want to waste my time.” (Lucas) 
 
It is as result of a purposeful evasion of political conversations with people who will 
disagree with them, an antipathy towards larger media companies, and an interest in niche news 
sites, that these “smaller” modes of media help shape Brazuca political thought. There is a 3.8% 
difference towards greater Bolsonaro support from viewers of smaller news media (82.4%) than 
from those of larger news media (78.6%). 
 
 
Analysis 
Exceptions to the Rule 
There were notable exceptions to the rule: seven participants were not Bolsonaristas. Why is 
that the case? What makes these interviewees different than the rest?  
 
Four of the seven are either not Christian or not practitioners in the traditional sense.  
“I used to be Catholic. But [now] I am not a Christian.” (Raphael, voted for Haddad) 
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“I would consider myself a Catholic. But I do not frequent any church.” (Camilla, voted 
for Haddad) 
“I do not practice any religion. I would consider myself agnostic.” (Vito, voted for other)  
“I am Catholic. But I do not go to church.” (Clara, voted for other) 
 
One had a unique experience that made her disdainful of conservative politicians.  
“Three years ago, I was discriminated against for my political beliefs. I worked in education 
and the wife of the mayor came to me and said that if I did not vote for a particular candidate 
I would lose my job. And I did not vote for that candidate, so I lost my job. The candidate was 
conservative.” (Amanda, voted for other) 
 
The last two professed to being Americanized. They were indifferent, seemingly apathetic, to 
Brazilian politics.   
“I came to the United States when I was eighteen years old. I have forgotten about Brazil. 
My last visit was eight years ago. In Brazil, there is only corrupt government.” (Adriano, 
voted for other) 
“I came here when I was really young. I was fourteen years old. So, I spent my entire 
adolescence here.” (Alexandre, voted for other)  
 
Through the process of naturalization, migrants can supplant patriotism for the home 
country with a similar ardor for the host polity. 52% of naturalized citizens in contrast to 39% of 
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undocumented respondents report patriotic feelings for the United States.41 The more time 
naturalized citizens spend in the United States the more assimilated they become. There is a 
positive correlation between the incremental length of time in the U.S. and the likelihood of 
registering to vote. This points to an increased interest in American politics.42   
 
We see this shift taking place with Adriano and Alexandre. They are indifferent to a 
nationalistic candidate in the home polity, such as Bolsonaro, but more concerned with politics in 
the United States. In fact, both were avid Trump supporters.  
 
“I like Trump… because he cares about the economy. [He] allows everyone to work and 
keeps gas prices and inflation stable.” (Adriano, voted for other) 
 
“Trump is just trying to see who is coming into the country. Would your parents allow 
strangers into your house? [Trump] wants immigrants. But he just wants to get to know 
them. That is why he is closing the border.” (Alexandre, voted for other) 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Roger Waldinger and Lauren Duquette-Rury. “Emigrant Politics, Immigrant Engagement: Homeland Ties and 
Immigrant Political Identity in the United States.” RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, 
vol. 2, no. 3, 2016, pp. 42–59. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7758/rsf.2016.2.3.03. 
42 Loretta E. Bass and Lynne M. Casper. “Impacting the Political Landscape: Who Registers and Votes among 
Naturalized Americans?” Political Behavior, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001, pp. 103–130. JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/1558363. 
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Conclusion 
 This study has sought to show what factors lend itself to the unprecedented support of 
President Jair Bolsonaro among Brazilian voters in Massachusetts. A preliminary hypothesis 
pointed to the interconnection between stigmatization and religion as propagators of political 
thought. The partaking in more niche news media was believed to bolster undiluted conservative 
ideals shaped by the community’s religious impetus.  
 Scholarship on Brazilian communities throughout the U.S. and of other migrant 
communities (Turks, Bolivians, Cubans) provided the theory on a possible relationship between 
stigmatization, religion, and politics. Studies conducted in rural regions of Brazil helped define the 
linkage between media and its impact on political thought. A recruitment process gathered a 
sample population of Brazilian immigrants in Massachusetts to participate in the study. 32 
individuals were organized into 3 different groups, consisting of a control group (G1) and two 
experimental sections (G2 and G3). A series of questions were asked, some of a quantitative nature 
but most of a qualitative one. Open-ended questions provided detailed open-ended responses that 
allowed the researcher to better understand the electoral behavior of Brazilian immigrants. 
Presentation of YouTube videos to participants in both G2 and G3 helped garner a better 
understanding of matters pertaining to the interconnection between religion and politics and 
xenophobic attitudes in the United States.  
 Results indicated that there did not exist a direct tie between discrimination and a rise in 
radical political behavior among Brazucas. That is to say, experiences of discrimination are not 
suggestive of an individual’s identity as a Bolsonarista. In fact, questionnaire results show that 
those who did not suffer discrimination are 3.6% more likely to have voted for Bolsonaro. 
However, it would be difficult to argue that discrimination does not have an effect on the 
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immigrant’s desire for a communal need. And the church is a communal center that provides 
solidarity and mutual aid. 59.3% of Brazilians saw churches as a primary place of socialization in 
their lives. As provided by interview responses, participants who faced discrimination were more 
likely to be Christian. And Christians, specifically evangelicals, were more likely to be 
Bolsonaristas. 95% of evangelicals were pro-Bolsonaro compared to only 55.5% of Catholics. 
Therefore, the tie between discrimination and radical politics is existent but indirect. The 
relationship between a partaking in niche news media and support for Bolsonaro was more readily 
demonstrated in data collected during interviews. Consumers of smaller news outlets, such as 
social media channels and blogs, had a 3.8% higher likelihood of having voted for Bolsonaro in 
contrast to consumers of larger media, such as television. 
 The section on “Exceptions to the Rule” shows that of the 7 non-Bolsonaristas, 4 are either 
not Christian or do not congregate at any church. In this way, they are devoid of the same 
experiences of other participants. That exclusion sets them in a different mold. They are not 
indoctrinated with the same thoughts as their compatriots. Another non-Bolsonarista is presently 
an avid non-conservative. And 2 others are Americanized. They have distanced themselves from 
any nationalistic fervor towards the home polity.  
 Future versions of this research should try to include a larger population sample that is 
more demonstrative of the Brazilian immigrant community in Massachusetts. A larger sample will 
help researchers arrive at a true statistical average that can provide more generalizable information. 
And as regards the research design, it would be necessary to reword the question on discrimination 
so to better understand how the effects of “stigmatization” or “hardship” impact the Brazuca. 
Doing so would help the researcher better analyze any linkages between discrimination, religion, 
and politics. Minimal research has been done that focuses particularly on the political conceptions 
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of Brazucas. Future studies should work to track changes, often drastic, in the electoral behavior 
of Brazilian immigrants. With incremental steps towards a fuller understanding of the Brazilian 
community, we start to arrive at a reality where Brazucas are no longer an “invisible ingredient” 
in this nation’s “melting pot.”43   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
43 Margolis 1994. 
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Appendix  
Questionnaire (English) 
 
You are being invited to participate in a study on the opinions and behaviors of Brazilians expat 
voters. Remember that your participation is voluntary and that the information below is 
confidential and will not be disclosed. Your legal status will not be asked nor divulged. 
 
1) What is your gender? 
1 ( ) Female 
2 ( ) Male 
3 ( ) Other 
98 ( ) Prefer not to respond 
 
2) What is your age? __________ 
 
3) Who did you vote for you in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential election?  
1 ( ) Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) 
2 ( ) Fernando Haddad (PT) 
3 ( ) Other: __________________________________ 
98 ( ) Prefer not to respond 
 
4) What is your highest educational attainment level? 
1 ( ) Illiterate/ Never attended school 
2 ( ) Less than primary school (1st – 8th in both Brazilian and American school systems) 
3 ( ) Completed primary school (finished 8th grade in both Brazilian and American school 
systems) 
4 ( ) Incomplete secondary school (1st – 2nd year of Brazilian high school/ less than 12th grade 
in U.S.) 
5 ( ) Completed secondary school (3rd year of Brazilian high school/ 12th grade in U.S.) 
6 ( ) Incomplete college degree or specialization (technical after secondary school) 
7 ( ) College degree or higher 
98 ( ) Prefer not to respond 
 
5) Experience of discrimination in the host country (in the past 12 months)?  
1 ( ) Yes 
2 ( ) No 
98 ( ) Prefer not to respond 
 
6) If Yes to question 5 then what is the level of discrimination you have faced? 
1 ( ) Very little 
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2 ( )  
3 ( )  
4 ( )  
5 ( ) Moderate 
6 ( )  
7 ( )  
8 ( )  
9 ( )  
10 ( ) Worst possible 
 
7) What is your religious affiliation? 
1 ( ) Christian/Protestant 
1.1.( ) Evangelical 
1.2. ( ) Non-Evangelical 
2 ( ) Catholic 
3 ( ) Jewish 
4 ( ) Muslim 
5 ( ) Buddhist 
6 ( ) Hindu 
7 ( ) Atheist/ Agnostic/ I don’t believe in God 
98 ( ) Prefer not to respond 
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Appendix  
Questionnaire (Portuguese) 
 
Você está sendo convidado a participar de um estudo sobre as opiniões políticas e comportamento 
eleitoral de brasileiros que vivem em Massachusetts. Lembre-se de que sua participação é 
voluntária e que as informações abaixo são confidenciais e não serão divulgadas. Seu status 
imigratório não será solicitado nem divulgado. 
 
1) Qual é o seu sexo? 
1 ( ) Feminino 
2 ( ) Masculino 
3 ( ) Outro 
98 ( ) Prefiro não responder 
 
2) Qual é a sua idade?  __________ 
 
3) Em quem você votou nas eleições presidenciais do Brasil de 2018? 
1 ( ) Jair Bolsonaro (PSL) 
2 ( ) Fernando Haddad (PT) 
3 ( ) Outro: __________________________________ 
98 ( ) Prefiro não responder 
 
4) Qual é o seu nível educacional? 
1 ( ) Analfabeto / Nunca frequentou a escola 
2 ( ) Menor do que o ensino fundamental (1ª - 8ª séries no sistema escolar brasileiro e 
americano) 
3 ( ) Ensino fundamental completo (terminado o 8º ano no sistema escolar brasileiro e 
americano) 
4 ( ) Ensino médio incompleto (1º ao 2º ano do ensino médio brasileiro / menor que o 12º ano 
nos EUA) 
5 ( ) Ensino médio completo (3º ano do ensino médio brasileiro / 12º ano nos EUA) 
6 ( ) Superior ou especialização (técnica após o ensino médio) incompleto  
7 ( ) Superior completo 
98 ( ) Prefiro não responder 
 
5) Experiência de discriminação no país anfitrião (nos últimos 12 meses)? 
1 ( ) Sim 
2 ( ) Não 
98 ( ) Prefiro não responder 
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6) Se sim à pergunta 5, qual é o nível de discriminação que você enfrentou? 
1 ( ) Mínima 
 2 ( )  
3 ( )  
4 ( )  
5 ( ) Moderada 
6 ( )  
7 ( )  
8 ( )  
9 ( )  
10 ( ) Pior possível 
 
7) Qual é a sua afiliação religiosa? 
1 ( ) Cristão / Protestante 
1.3.( ) 1.1 Evangélico 
1.4. ( ) Não Evangélico 
2 ( ) Católico 
3 ( ) Judeu 
4 ( ) Muçulmano 
5 ( ) Budista 
6 ( ) Hindu 
7 ( ) Ateu / Agnóstico / Não acredito em Deus 
98 ( ) Prefiro não responder 
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Appendix  
Breakdown of Questionnaire Answers 
 
Age Group Breakdown of Respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Close-ended survey questionnaire. Question: “What is your age?” 
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Voter Preference (in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential Election) of Respondents 
 
Source: Close-ended survey questionnaire. Question: “Who did you vote for you in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential 
election?” 
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Educational Attainment Level of Respondents 
 
Source: Close-ended survey questionnaire. Question: “What is your highest educational attainment level?” 
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Religious Affiliation of Respondents 
 
 
Sources: Close-ended survey questionnaire. Question: “What is your religious affiliation?” 
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Appendix  
Focus Group/Interview Questions 
 
 
1.1.Script applied to groups G1 and G2 
 
1.1.1. Opening (15 minutes) 
Create conditions favorable to participation. Begin by explicitly stating that legal status 
will not be asked. Additionally, stress the idea that there exists no right or wrong answer 
and/or good or bad argument. Every idea is important. There is also a natural expectation 
that there will be different points of view among individuals in the group. 
 
Intervention 1: Ask the participants to briefly talk about themselves.  
 
Intervention 2: If you could describe the perfect political candidate for you to vote on, how 
would they be?  
 
1.1.2. Evaluation of socialization and its impact on political knowledge and formation of 
preferences (45-60 minutes) 
Objective: Identify what is the level of interest and awareness of Brazilian politics among 
participants.  
 
Intervention 1: In what spaces do you socialize most often, and how frequently? Is it 
through telecommunications or physically in shops, restaurants, residencies, areas of 
fraternity such as churches or other? 
 
Intervention 2: In these spaces that you have listed, what is discussed? Do you discuss 
politics?  
 
Intervention 3: What aspects of politics do you discuss? Do you participate in these 
conversations? If yes, then with who?  
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Intervention 4: Do you think these conversations have an impact on what you think 
politically? If yes, then how?  
 
1.1.3. Finalizing the discussion (15-20 minutes) 
Gauge what group members thought of the discussion (their perceptions, ideas, knowledge, 
and opinions). Observe if there were any significant changes to the group dynamic.  
 
Final Intervention: And now, if you could describe the perfect political candidate, how 
would they be?  
 
Objective: Identify the ways in which discussion leads to a change in political thought. Or 
in other words, to better understand how and why 86% of Brazilian expats living abroad in 
Massachusetts voted for Bolsonaro in the 2018 Presidential election (in contrast to only 
55% of the Brazilian populace in Brazil).   
 
~~~ 
 
1.2. Script applied to groups G3 and G4 
 The initial script will replicate points 1.1.1. to 1.1.2.  
 
1.2.3. Evaluate the impact of religious media (30-45 minutes) 
Objective: Conduct the religious experiment using Christian media and identify whether 
there is a change in the final opinion of participants.  
 
Intervention 1: Do you watch the news? Use social media, radio, television? Which ones? 
And how frequently? 
 
Intervention 2: What do you think of religious figures using media for political ends? How 
often do you watch, hear, or read religious media? Do you think this kind of media can 
influence people?  
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Intervention 3: I will be presenting videos and social media posts that show (nuanced) 
favoritism towards Bolsonaro’s campaign as a matter of religious principle. Participants 
will be asked to position themselves on how they feel about the media shown to them.  
 
1.2.4. Finalizing the discussion (15-20 minutes) 
Seek to gauge the perceptions and ideas of participants. Observe if there were any changes 
to the group dynamic, so to understand how the group influenced the formation of political 
opinion.  
 
Final Intervention: And now, if you could describe the perfect political candidate, how 
would they be?  
 
Objective: Identify the ways in which discussion leads to a change in political thought. In 
particular, have a better understanding of how the elector’s religious principles, their 
perceptions of the world, and their interactions with other members of the group, leads the 
participants to craft an ideal political candidate. There is an expectation that, after having 
discussed religious media, this ideal candidate will be different than those created by 
participants in G1 and G2. 
 
~~~ 
 
1.3. Script applied to groups G5 and G6 
 The initial script will replicate points 1.1.1. to 1.1.2.  
 
1.3.3. Evaluate the impact of xenophobic American media (30-45 minutes) 
Objective: Conduct an experiment using xenophobic American media and identify whether 
there is a change in the final opinion of participants.  
 
Intervention 1: Do you watch the news? Use social media, radio, television? Which ones? 
And how frequently? 
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Intervention 2: What do you think of xenophobic broadcasters using media for political 
ends? What do you think of xenophobic politicians using media for political ends? How 
often do you watch, hear, or read xenophobic media? Do you think this kind of media can 
influence people?  
 
Intervention 3: I will be presenting speeches given by President Trump and his 
administration, Fox News segments on immigration, and debates given on the Senate floor 
over border protection. Participants will be asked to position themselves on how they feel 
about the media shown to them.  
 
1.3.4. Finalizing the discussion (15-20 minutes) 
Seek to gauge the perceptions and ideas of participants. Observe if there were any changes 
to the group dynamic, so to understand how the group influenced the formation of political 
opinion.  
 
Final Intervention: And now, if you could describe the perfect political candidate, how 
would they be?  
 
Objective: Identify the ways in which discussion leads to a change in political thought. In 
particular, have a better understanding of how being discriminated against (on account of 
being an immigrant), their perceptions of the world, and their interactions with other 
members of the group, leads the participants to craft an ideal political candidate. There is 
an expectation that, after having discussed xenophobic media, this ideal candidate will be 
different than those created by participants in G1 – G4.  
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